Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) have been the target of several antitrust investigations by the European Commission in recent years and are the subject of an announced proposal for an EU Regulation. MIFs, which are charged by the cardholder's (issuing) bank to the merchant's (acquiring) bank, form an important part of the transaction fees paid by merchants to their banks. Concerns that excessively high MIFs could lead to inflated merchant fees have led to discussions that they should be regulated. One proposed method to set a benchmark for MIF levels is the Tourist Test (also known as 'merchant indifference 1 Corresponding author: Nicole Jonker: n.jonker@dnb.nl. Comments by Hans Brits and seminar participants from the ECB and European Commission are gratefully accepted. All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed in this paper are ours and do not necessarily reflect those of the Nederlandsche Bank or the European System of Central Banks.
test' or 'avoided-cost test'), developed by Tirole (2007, 2011) . This test indicates the MIF level for which merchants are indifferent in accepting cash or cards; i.e. this fee level ensures that merchants do not pay higher charges than the value of the net transactional benefits which card use gives them compared to cash.
This study presents estimates for the MIF level based on the Tourist Test methodology using recently collected cost data for the Netherlands. As part of the ECB cost study by Schmiedel, Kostova and Ruttenberg (2012) , DNB collected cost information for 2009 for cash and debit card payments which was described in Jonker (2013) . It presents the development of the social costs for cash and debit card payments for the Netherlands between 2002 and 2009. Together with information on the private costs for merchants, interchange fees for debit card payments have been calculated using the Tourist Test methodology. As far as we know, we are the first to apply the Tourist Test to empirical data, thereby showing the potential effects of using this test in practice. Note that the presented interchange fees in this article are fees derived from the theoretical literature. (Schwimann, 2008-09) . The current average fee levels of 0.20% (0.30%) of the transaction amount for debit (credit) card payments were calculated by MC using cost information for the Netherlands in 2002, see Brits and Winder (2005) , Belgium in 2003, see Banque Nationale de Belgique (2005) , and Sweden in 2002, see Bergman, Guibourg and Segendorf (2007) . The Commission agreed with this methodology and these fee levels, but stated that they may be adjusted if for instance new data becomes available that reveals that the current fee levels are not adequate anymore. 2 On April 2009 VISA received a State of Objections of the Commission. As a result of the State of Objections VISA announced on April 2010 that it would cap its weighted average intra-regional MIF for immediate debit card payments to 0.20% of the transaction value for four years, a level which the Commission judged to be consistent with the Tourist Test. The cap also holds for nine domestic markets.
In both the Visa and the MasterCard cases, the Tourist Test MIFs are much lower than the MIFs they used previously. However, in both cases the Tourist Test methodology has so far only been used one-off. If it were to be adopted as a regulatory benchmark, the methodology would have to be used repeatedly to recalculate maximum MIF levels based on new cost data.
Social costs for POS payments are influenced by changes in consumers' payment behaviour, as payment instruments differ in the costs agents in the payment chain incur to make them possible.
3 Between 2002 and 2009, there was a substantial shift in the Netherlands from cash to debit card payments. Other means of payment are hardly used. The number of debit card payments at the point-of-sale increased by 82% from 1.1 billion to 1.9 billion, and the value of the debit card payments rose by 65% from EUR 47 billion to EUR 76 billion. The number of cash payments declined from 7.1 billion to 4.6 billion, and their value from EUR 66 billion to EUR 58 billion. The move from cash to debit card payments resulted in substantial cost savings (Jonker, 2013) . In 2009, the social costs borne by the central bank, the banking sector and merchants together for cash and debit card payments was EUR 2.405 billion, which is EUR 237 million less than the social costs in 2002 when it amounted EUR 2.642
2 MasterCard brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission's decision. In its judgment delivered on 24th of May 2012, the General Court dismissed that action and confirmed the Commission's decision. 3 Social costs refer to the costs to society, reflecting the use of resources in the production of payment services; that is the total costs of production. These costs refer to the sum of the internal costs incurred by the Dutch central bank (DNB), merchants and the banking industry. Internal costs are proxied by the costs incurred by these market participants and transfers to other market participants related to cash or debit card payment. These other market participants include for instance the ACH Equens (formerly known as Interpay), cash-in-transit companies and telecom companies. Transfers to and from DNB, banks and merchants sort out in the social costs concept, and are therefore excluded. The remainder of this study is organised as follows: section 2 reviews related literature, while section 3 discusses the theoretic framework. Section 4 and 5 describe the used methodology and data collection, section 6 gives the estimation results; and section 7 discusses the potential effects on merchant and consumer fees. Finally, section 8 concludes with implications for policy and directions for further research.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this section we first provide a review of the literature that appeared prior to Rochet and Tirole (2011) and then we discuss Rochet and Tirole (2011)'s Tourist Test for interchange fees for card payments.
The economic theoretical literature, starting with Baxter (1983) , provides a rationale for the usage of interchange fees in two-sided markets. See e.g. Börestam and Schmiedel (2011 ), Verdier (2011 ) or Bolt (2013 for an up-to-date overview of the literature. The card payments market with consumers and merchants as two distinct groups of end users is an example of a two-sided market. Banks co-operate in a card network and set payment prices for both consumers and merchants to encourage card usage among consumers and card acceptance among merchants. Their goal is to maximise the card network's overall profits.
The bank of one of the end users, usually the accepting party, may pay a so-called interchange fee to the bank of the other end user for every card payment. Banks use this fee to balance the demand for card services between the two types of end-users. The optimal balance depends on banks' costs and on the differences in the demand elasticities for card payments of consumers and merchants. The assumption that merchants are relatively less price elastic compared to consumers is commonly used as a rationale to justify that acquiring banks pay interchange fees to issuing banks, thus raising merchant service fees for card payments and lowering consumer fees.
Others built on Baxter's model. They relax assumptions, such as the one concerning noncompetitive behaviour among merchants (Rochet and Tirole (2002) or homogeneity among merchants (Schmalensee, 2002 and Wright, 2004) . Rochet and Tirole (2002) introduce strategic behaviour by merchants in their theoretical two-sided card market model. They find that merchants who face competition may accept cards even when acquiring fees exceed the net merchant benefits. They do so in order to attract customers from competitors who do not accept cards (yet) or because they feel obliged to accept cards so as not to lose customers to card-accepting competitors. In such a market, the profit maximizing interchange fee for issuing banks may be higher than the socially optimal interchange fee, leading to the overprovision of card services. Vickers (2005) describes the outcome that merchants feel obliged to accept card payments out of competitive considerations as the 'must take cards'
concern. This expression was adopted later on by Rochet and Tirole (2011) . Wright (2004) builds on Baxter (2003) and introduces merchant heterogeneity in his model. He allows merchants in different sectors to reap different benefits from card acceptance. As a result, cards will be accepted in some sectors, but not in others. He focuses on variable acceptance costs. Unlike Wright, McAndrews and Wang (2008) consider both fixed and variable costs.
They analyse the adoption of payment cards among merchants that differ in size or average transaction amount. They find that large merchants and merchants selling high-value products will be quicker to adopt the payment card than other merchants as card acceptance reduces their transaction costs compared to acceptance of cash only. As adoption costs fall over time due to economies of scale, other merchants will start accepting cards as well. Tirole (2007, 2011) 
THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
In this section we describe a theoretic framework for payment pricing that is largely based on Rochet and Tirole's (2011) "must-take cards" analysis. This framework provides a useful tool for analysing interchange fee setting and potential regulatory intervention (see also e.g. Bolt and Chakravorti, 2012; Bèdre-Defolie and Calvano, 2010; Rochet and Wright, 2010; Wright, 2012) .
The Model
There are three types of agents-consumers, merchants, and banks. A continuum of consumers resides on the line segment between 0 and 1, with quasi-linear preferences.
Consumers are willing to buy one unit of good sold (the "retail good") by each of the R merchants who enjoy some market power. Let v denote the value of the retail good purchased by cash, that is the consumption value net of all cash-related transactions costs. A consumer receives v 0 =v-p ≥ 0 from purchasing a unit good by cash at price p, and the merchant gets p from this purchase. We assume that v is large enough so that the aggregate demand for the retail good is constant and equal to 1.
To maximize their expected utility, consumers must decide whether to use cash or a payment card to buy a good. We assume that they know the retail price p and card acceptance policy of the merchants before they enter the store. All consumers have a payment card. Consumers receive an additional (per-transaction) payoff b c -p c if they pay by card rather than by cash. The cardholder fee p c is charged by the consumer bank. After retail prices are posted, consumers get to know their transactional benefit b c and once in the store they select their preferred payment method (cash or cards) accordingly. We assume price coherence: the merchant does not (or is not allowed to) charge different retail prices based on the payment method used by the consumer-i.e. the no-surcharge rule is imposed.
5
Consumers differ with respect to their transactional benefits b c they receive from using their cards. Consumer heterogeneity is described by a probability density function f c (x), -∞ ≤ x ≤ +∞, with corresponding cumulative probability function F c (x) . Alternatively, we may 5 There is a general tendency for retailers to stick to the setting of a single price regardless of the mode of payment (Rochet and Wright, 2010) . For example, in the Netherlands where surcharging is allowed, only a small and diminishing fraction of retailers imposes surcharges on debit card payments (see also Bolt, Jonker and Van Renselaar, 2010) .
interpret the benefit b c as the convenience cost for the consumer of paying by cash (relative to a payment card). Clearly, a consumer is only willing to use his card whenever b c -p c ≥ 0.
Therefore, the proportion of card payments at a store that accepts cards is denoted:
(1)
The net average cardholder benefit per card payment is denoted by:
( 2) which is a decreasing function of p c .
Merchants try to maximize profits by their card acceptance policy. The profit margin of one For simplicity, we assume merchant homogeneity, that is, the convenience benefit b m is equal for every merchant. This convenience benefit may also be interpreted as the merchant's cost of a cash payment (relative to a card payment). Furthermore, we assume (full) merchant internalization, implying that merchants accept the card if and only if:
Merchant internalization reflects the idea that merchants are willing to accept cards even when the direct costs (p m ) are higher than the direct benefits (b m ) in order to offer a better quality of service to their customers (who value this payment option). Ultimately, merchants may be able to extract this additional consumer surplus through higher retailer prices or higher market shares. Notice that due to merchant homogeneity it is either the case that all
We assume a single card system operated by a card association (that is jointly owned by the banks). 7 The card association determines the interchange fee a. The association requires the merchant (i.e. acquiring) bank to pay this fee a to the consumer (i.e. issuing) bank. For each card transaction, the issuer incurs a (net) cost c I -a and the acquirer c A +a. Let c=c I +c A denote the total cost of a card transaction. Note that the interchange fee does not change the total cost of a card transaction nor the mark-up per transaction given consumer and merchant card prices. We assume that the card association sets the interchange fee so as to maximize the sum of profits earned by its issuers and acquirers. For convenience, it is assumed that the acquiring market is perfectly competitive with zero profit margins, m A =0. By contrast, issuers may have some market power and we assume that their profit margin is constant, m I ≥ 0. 8 Finally, the cost of cash payments for banks are normalized to zero.
Optimal Payment Pricing
First we look at social welfare. Some algebraic manipulations show that social welfare can be written (up to a constant) as:
( 4) such that:
6 In the case of merchant heterogeneity an interior solution characterizes optimal consumer and merchant demand for card payments. In this solution some merchants do not accept cards since the benefits of accepting are too low compared to using cash. Qualitatively, however, not much is changed. 7 This "monopolistic" environment is a good illustration of the Dutch retail payment landscape where debit cards play a dominant role next to cash at the point of sale (POS). In particular, debit cards account for more than 90% volume of all electronic POS transactions in the Netherlands in 2012. 8 The case with varying issuing margins does not qualitatively change the results (see Rochet and Tirole, 2011) . If issuers do not fully pass on cost decreases to consumers-i.e., cost amplification-then pushing for lower interchange fees would increase their profits even further. The reverse result would hold in the case of cost absorption. Constant margins imply 100 percent cost pass-through. It is not difficult to show that for socially optimal card prices and interchange fee:
At the social optimum, acquiring profits are zero, , and 
If the interchange fee would be capped at a T , consumer fees cannot be set low enough to induce all consumers who generate social surplus to use the payment card at the point of sale. Only when the issuing market is perfectly competitive with zero margins m I =0, the Tourist Test interchange fee a T coincides with the socially optimal interchange fee a S .
However, when we look at total user surplus, ignoring issuer and acquirer profits, by only concentrating on the spread between total benefits (b c +b m ) and total prices (p c +p m =m I +c), this discrepancy can be restored. In particular, defining total user surplus as: 
Under total user surplus maximization, acquiring profits are zero, , and issuing profits amount to . The result in (9) shows that for total user surplus maximization the optimal interchange fee a U equals the Tourist Test fee a T . The Tourist Test would be able to detect excessive fees from a total user surplus point of view, but would yield false positives with respect to social welfare.
Profit maximizing card fees such that the card association maximizes issuing profits, are easy to derive. By noting that merchants are homogenous, they will all be pushed to their max, i.e. the merchant discount is set to . This (implicitly) implies the highest interchange fee a* and therefore the lowest consumer fee . Since issuing profits are decreasing in consumer fees, this yields maximum profits. We derive: Other things being equal, merchants will increasingly prefer cards over cash when the cost of cash rises. More precise, the merchant transactional benefit, b m , of accepting cards relative to cash increases when the (average) cost of a cash payment, say k 0 , increases, i.e., db m /dk 0 > 0. Moreover, due to considerable scale and scope economies in retail payment systems, the average cost of cash will even further increase when the volume of cash payments, N cp , goes down (and consequently card volume, N dc , goes up), i.e., dk 0 /dN cp < 0.
These conditions may lead to some interesting dynamics.
In our model setup the consumer fee p c fully determines the volume of card payments and consequently the volume of cash payments assuming that total payment volume is fixed,
Hence an initial (positive) shock to k 0 leads to a rise in b m . Since da/dk 0 =da/db m ·db m /dk 0 >0, optimal interchange fees will increase as well, including the Tourist Test fee. Accordingly the consumer fee will fall. This pushes up the use of cards and trims down the use of cash.
This decline in cash volume will tend to increase the (average) cost of cash even further and a new round of price adjustments start. Schematically:
From this reasoning we may conclude that increases in cost of cash due to scale effects and technological progress in electronic payments will further push up interchange fees and therefore merchant discounts. However, this may be optimal since convenient benefits of electronic payments increase as well. Lower processing cost c will translate mainly into lower consumer fees so as to optimally boost card demand.
( ) and
ESTIMATING THE TOURIST TEST BENCHMARK
In this section we outline how our theoretical framework of the Tourist Test methodology is used to derive an empirical benchmark based on cost data from merchants. The Tourist Test method is based on the idea that a merchant's decision to accept a card payment or not, depends on which of the two payment instruments, cash or debit card, brings the highest benefits. It is implicitly assumed that the merchant accepts both cash and debit card payments and that he has already incurred the fixed costs associated with cash and debit card payments. What matters to him, when a customer enters the store with both cash and a debit card in his wallet, are the additional costs he will be facing. Solving for a T gives (13c) a T = α cash +β cash *x -α card,Vt,int -γ.
As a T depends on the transaction value, we formulate (3c) as (13d) a T (x) = α cash +β cash *x -α card,Vt,int -γ.
DATA
We used data from several sources for our analysis. A detailed overview can be found in Jonker and Plooij (2013 estimates.
Data collection
Information about the total number and the value of POS payments in 2002 were taken from Brits and Winder (2005) . Their study also provides cost information on cash and debit card payments for retailers, which were collected by research institute EIM. 11 Additional information about the external costs, such as cash deposition fees and acquiring fees for debit card payments for retailers were based on statistics published by HBD (2002) 
Fixed versus variable costs
The different cost items that constitute costs for merchants can be divided into fixed and variable costs. This distinction is relevant for our study, which focuses on variable costs for merchants. Fixed costs relate to the cost items that are not affected by the performance of a specific transaction or by to the sales amounts generated by a specific means of payment. An example of such a fixed cost item is the depreciation costs of a cash register or a POS payment terminal. Variable costs do have such a relation. Some of these costs depend only 11 In a nutshell, EIM (2011)'s approach to collect merchants' cost is as follows: the core of their survey is a telephone questionnaire among a large representative sample of small and medium sized merchants at business level. Questions were asked about their incoming payment transactions, labour time associated with payment related activities and costs and fees paid to other parties. In addition, EIM distributed a written questionnaire among the (very) large retail companies at concern level. This has been supplemented with data about bank fees from the commercial banks, cash usage from DNB and debit card usage from Currence (scheme owner Dutch debit card scheme 'PIN'). Finally a time registration was carried out on location to estimate the front office time (payment time) per transaction per payment method. A similar approach has been used by a majority of the NCBs participating in the ECB-study by Schmiedel et al. (2012) . on whether the transaction is carried out or not (e.g. front office costs for cash and debit card payments or telecommunication costs of a debit card payment), while others are related to the transaction amount involved (e.g. professional money transport and a large part of the back-office activities related to cash payments such as counting banknotes and coins). In the case of cash, the variable costs increase with the transaction amount, whereas the costs for debit card payments mainly depend on whether the transaction is carried out or not.
Following the spirit of the Tourist Test we employ the merchant's perspective of which costs are fixed and which are variable. 13 See EIM (2011) Table 2 provides an overview of the composition of the internal costs and external costs incurred for cash and debit card payments by the retailers in 2002 and 2009. The private costs do not only include the costs incurred by these agents themselves to make a payment with a particular payment instrument possible (internal costs). They also take into account the external costs and revenues they face. External costs for one party in the payment chain often constitute revenues for another, such as annual fees and acquiring fees paid by merchants to the acquiring banks. 14 Furthermore, merchants' revenues from surcharging customers for debit card usage have been taken into account. 15 In addition, external costs include the opportunity costs of holding cash or non-interest bearing transaction balances which can be considered as implicit transfers.
Internal versus external costs
The bottom three rows in Table 1 
ESTIMATION RESULTS

Development of Tourist Test interchange fees
Using Dutch cost data for merchants and the formula derived in section 4 we find the The nominal and the relative value of a T depend positively on the transaction size. In Table 2 we present the interchange fee a The results indicate that the higher the transaction size the higher a T will be relative to the transaction size. Moreover, they indicate that using the Tourist Test methodology may lead to an a T that exceeds the internal cost of a debit card payment borne by banks. The average MIF fee level of 20 cents for 2009 actually exceeds the internal costs of a debit card payment of 17 cents borne by banks (Jonker, 2013) . These 17 cents include both issuing and 16 For a merchant not only the costs associated with accepting a payment with a particular payment instrument matter, also other benefits may be of importance to him. Aspects such safety, the possibility of additional sales, tax evasion or the desire to be customer friendly may also influence the value he attaches to a cash or a card payment. However, it is hard to quantify such benefits. Therefore we focus in the current analysis on the role of costs. acquiring costs, whereas one of the main rationales of the interchange fee is to compensate the issuing bank for part of its internal costs. Note that the "virtual" Tourist Test MIF also lies well above the actual interchange fee level in the Netherlands, which ranges between 1 -2 eurocents.
We also estimated what would have been total interchange revenues from all debit card payments in the Netherlands in 2009 if this methodology would have been used to set the level of the interchange fee for debit card payments. It amounts to EUR 370 million, which is EUR 75 million more than the internal costs borne by both issuing and acquiring banks together for debit card payments (Jonker, 2013) . So, the Tourist Test methodology to set the MIF level for debit card payments might lead to disproportionate fee levels. Table 3 presents the results of two robustness checks on the development of the Tourist test MIF using alternative specifications for the fee and costs structures. The first alternative refers to the fee structure. Unlike in many other countries, in the Netherlands acquiring fees and interchange fees for debit card payments are fixed and do not depend on the transaction amount. If Dutch fees were ad valorem instead of fixed, the resulting a T would be at most 1 eurocent higher than the ones presented in Table 3 . However, the main result would still Summarizing, the outcomes of the two alternative cost categorizations suggest that our results are robust to different cost categorizations and different fee structures.
Robustness checks
Drivers of the increase in the Tourist Test interchange fee
The question is which factors are responsible for the increase in the Tourist Test MIF.
Corroborating with the theoretic framework, the interchange fee level a T is sensitive to changes in the merchant's private variable costs for cash payments and in his private variable costs for debit card payments. Table 4 This raises the question how the increase in the level of a T has been passed through in the acquiring fee and in consumer (transaction) fees for debit card payments. Table 5 shows the realized fee levels for 2002 and 2009 and the virtual fee levels for 2009. We assume that the virtual fee levels were only influenced by the development of a T from 4 to 20 eurocents and that the change in the level of a T was completely passed through onto consumers.
The card acquiring fee for merchants would increase by 233% from on average 6 eurocents to 20 eurocents. The consumer transaction fee would drop from zero to -16 eurocents, i.e.
banks would reward their consumers with 16 eurocents for each debit card payment they made. 
FINAL REMARKS
According to several competition authorities and courts of justice interchange fees for card payments can be excessively high and exercise upward pressure on the merchant service fee.
There are discussions that these interchange fees should be regulated. One possibility is to introduce caps based on issuers' costs. Rochet and Tirole (2011) argue that while under certain conditions the interchange fee chosen by issuers may indeed exceed the short-term socially optimal level, there is no logical argument for caps based on issuers' costs. Another possibility for regulatory intervention is based on merchant's costs. Our theoretic framework 18 In theory, banks pass the interchange fee on to their customers. However, research by the European Commission (2006) showed that issuing banks only pass 25% of their revenues from interchange fees on to their card holders. Empirical evidence from another network industry, i.e. the telephone industry, where termination rates were reduced as part of regulatory measures also point to incomplete pass through of fee reductions to customers, see Genakos and Valletti (2011). shows that the Tourist Test benchmark is legitimate if one's aim is to maximize short-term total user surplus. The attraction of the Tourist Test methodology lies in the fact that card acceptance will not increase merchants' direct operating costs.
We show the development of the MIF level for debit card payments by applying the Tourist The reason is that merchants would hardly benefit from any of the efficiency gains that arise from increased debit card usage or improvements in the infrastructure for card payments, as these are (partly) neutralized by rising acquiring fees. With merchants having less incentive to stimulate card payments, the application of the Tourist Test could slow down the existing trend of increasing the use of debit cards. In a market where the social costs of debit card payments are now lower than those of cash, this would mean that potential social cost savings are not realised.
The effects of the use of the Tourist Test on merchant and consumer fee levels and finally on the acceptance and use of payment cards depends not only on the level of the interchange fee but also on other aspects of the market, such as pass-through. Adjustments may need to be made to the theoretical model to account for specific market characteristics. 
